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Abstract
Increasing knowledge of paedophile activity in P2P systems is a crucial
societal concern, with important consequences on child protection, policy
making, and internet regulation. Because of a lack of traces of P2P ex-
changes and rigorous analysis methodology, however, current knowledge
of this activity remains very limited. We consider here a widely used
P2P system, eDonkey, and focus on two key statistics: the fraction of
paedophile queries entered in the system and the fraction of users who
entered such queries. We collect hundreds of millions of keyword-based
queries; we design a paedophile query detection tool for which we esta-
blish false positive and false negative rates using assessment by experts;
with this tool and these rates, we then estimate the fraction of paedophile
queries in our data; finally, we design and apply methods for quantifying
users who entered such queries. We conclude that approximately 0.25%
of queries are paedophile, and that more than 0.2% of users enter such
queries. These statistics are by far the most precise and reliable ever
obtained in this domain.
1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that peer-to-peer (P2P) file exchange systems host
large amounts of paedophile content (mainly movies and pictures), which is a
crucial societal concern. In addition to children victimisation, the wide availabi-
lity of paedophile material is a great danger for regular users (including children
and teenagers), who may be exposed unintentionally to extremely harmful con-
tent. In particular, this may lead initially innocent users to develop an interest
in child pornography. It also has a strong impact on the public acceptance of
∗A shorter version of this work has been published in [17].
1
paedophilia and induces a trivialisation of such content. Much work is devoted
to these psychological and societal issues, see [21, 32].
Downloading and/or providing paedophile content is a legal offence in many
countries, and there is a correlation between downloading paedophile content
and having actual sexual intercourse with children [14]. This makes fighting
these exchanges a key issue for law enforcement [31, 33]. This also has much
impact on P2P and internet regulation, and is used as a key allegation against
people providing P2P facilities. For instance, people providing indexes of files
available in P2P systems (including a small fraction of files with paedophile
content) are often accused of helping and promoting paedophile exchanges, with
strong penal threats [6, 18].
For these reasons, knowledge of paedophile activity in P2P systems is a
critical resource for law enforcement, child protection and policy making. See
[21, 31, 32, 33] for surveys on these issues. However, current knowledge on
this activity and its extent remains very limited and is subject to controversy
[12, 16, 26, 29, 31, 32].
In this paper, we provide ground truth on paedophile activity in a large
P2P system, at an unprecedented level of accuracy and reliability. We focus
on two basic yet crucial statistics: the fraction of paedophile queries entered
in the system and the fraction of users entering such queries. We establish
reference methodology and tools for obtaining these values, and provide them
in the case of the eDonkey system, which is one of the largest P2P systems
currently used [22].
Obtaining precise such information on paedophile activity in P2P systems
raises several challenges:
• Appropriate data collection. Obtaining large-scale data of activity in P2P
systems is a difficult task in itself. The main reasons are the lack of
central authority, the size of these systems and their high dynamics, the
poor structure of the traffic, and limited user identification.
• Paedophile activity identification. As the relative amount of paedophile
activity in P2P systems is very low, quantifying it by manually inspecting
a random sample of the data is not feasible: this sample would have to
be very large in order to contain a significant amount of paedophile acti-
vity. Moreover, this activity is often hidden (paedophiles use very specific
keywords), and recognising it requires a deep expertise of the domain. Fi-
nally, machine learning approaches, though appealing, cannot be applied
in this context because of the lack of prior knowledge of representative
paedophile data.
• Rigorous inference of statistics. In a context where detection of paedophile
activity as well as user identification are prone to errors, inferring reliable
statistics is difficult. In addition, these statistics may fluctuate greatly
with time, which makes their relevance unsure. Direct computations are
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not satisfactory to this regard, and the statistics must be carefully exami-
ned before concluding.
To address these challenges, we make the following contributions:
• Datasets. We collect and publicly provide two sets of keyword-based
queries entered by eDonkey users, on two different servers in 2007 and
2009. Each spans several weeks of activity (10 and 28, respectively) and
contains hundreds of millions keyword-based queries, involving millions of
users. Using two datasets collected on different servers and at different
dates increases the generality of our results significantly.
• Detection tool. Using domain knowledge of paedophile keywords, we de-
sign and publicly provide a tool for automatic detection of paedophile
queries. We evaluate its success rate by a rigorous assessment involving 21
experts having a deep knowledge of online paedophile activity. These ex-
perts work in various national and international law-enforcement agencies
and well-established NGOs, including Europol and the National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children.
• Quantification. Our tool detects hundreds of thousands paedophile queries
in our datasets. Using the error rates of the tool, we derive a reliable
estimate of the actual fraction of paedophile queries they contain, which is
approximately 0.25%. We then design several complementary approaches
to estimate the fraction of observed users who enter paedophile queries and
check both their statistical significance and their consistence. We finally
establish a lower bound of 0.2% for users who enter paedophile queries in
the 2007 dataset. Analysis of the 2009 dataset indicates that the 0.2%
bound is also valid in this case.
Figure 1 summarises our global methodology. We describe in Section 2 our
dataset collection and anonymisation. Section 3 presents our tool for automatic
detection of paedophile queries, our assessment methodology, and the estimates
of its error rates by experts of the field. We finally establish the fractions of
paedophile queries and users who entered them in Sections 4 and 5. We discuss
related work in Section 6.
Finally, we obtain, for the first time at this level of accuracy and reliability,
estimates of the two most crucial statistics on paedophile activity in a large P2P
system. We establish reference end-to-end methodology for tackling such issues
rigorously. We moreover provide publicly our full datasets, our paedophile query
detection tool, and the sets of detected paedophile queries [28]. We therefore
open the way to more research on paedophile activity and other activities in
P2P systems, which we discuss in Section 7.
2 Data
Although many extensions exist [30], the eDonkey system basically relies on a set
of 100 to 300 servers indexing available files and providers for these files. Clients
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Figure 1: Structure of the paper and main contributions.
send to these servers keyword-based queries (which may also contain meta-data
such as a type of file) describing the content they search for. Servers answer
with lists of files matching these keywords (typically, their filenames contain
these keywords). Clients may then ask the server for providers of selected files.
Once they have obtained this information, they may contact providers directly
to obtain the files. Servers only play the role of directories; they do not store
any exchanged file, and exchanges take place between clients, from peer to peer.
eDonkey is currently one of the largest P2P systems used, and this has been
true for several years [22].
We collected for this study two independent datasets, in 2007 and 2009. Both
consist of a recording of hundreds of millions keyword-based queries received by
an eDonkey server during a period of time of several weeks. To each query is
associated a timestamp and the IP address from which it was received. The
2007 dataset contains in addition the connection port number used for sending
each query. Notice that we do not observe exchanges actually occurring between
users, and have no access to file content. This is not obtainable in practice at
a large scale and is not mandatory for our purpose as we focus on what users
seek.
Key features of both datasets are summarised in Table 1. We detail the data
collection, normalisation and anonymisation procedures below.
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duration queries IP addresses (IP,port)
2007 10 weeks 107,226,021 23,892,531 50,341,797
2009 28 weeks 205,228,820 24,413,195 n/a
Table 1: Main features of our two datasets after normalisation, anonymisation,
and removal of empty queries.
2.1 Data collection
We collected the 2007 dataset on one of the main servers at that time, during
a 10-week continuous measurement. It consisted in doing an IP-level capture
of the UDP traffic on the server. We therefore had to decode this traffic into
application-level messages, and then to select keyword-based queries. One ad-
vantage of this dataset is that we were able to record both IP addresses and
connection ports of clients, which plays a key role in user quantification (Sec-
tion 5). The procedure for this measurement is fully detailed in [2].
We collected the 2009 dataset by a 28-week continuous measurement on a
medium-sized server at that time. We activated the log capability embedded
in the standard server software, which records directly (in a human-readable
textual format) timestamped keyword-based queries and the IP address they
were received from. We observe this way both UDP and TCP traffic, but have
no access to information on connection ports.
Figure 2 presents the roles of the client and server during an eDonkey ses-
sion. Due to the measurement techniques used on the different servers, some
information may or may not be available in our collected data.
Client Server
Sends: keywords
Receives: timestamp, IP address, 
[port], keywords
Sends: filenames matching keywords 
Receives: List of filenames
Sends: chosen filenames
Receives: filenames
Sends: addresses of providers
Receives: addresses 
of providers to contact
Figure 2: Client-server exchanges during an eDonkey session.
These datasets come from different servers, with different importance in the
network (one of the main servers for 2007 and a medium one for 2009), and the
measurement procedures were very different. In addition, three years elapsed
between the collection of these two datasets, with many evolutions: users are not
the same, the eDonkey software and protocols evolved significantly, many servers
were stopped due to actions of copyright holders [6], other P2P systems increased
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in popularity, etc. We therefore consider these two datasets as complementary,
which gives some insight on the robustness of our observations to measurement
conditions.
2.2 Normalisation and anonymisation
The traffic we observe contains much personal information, which we must re-
move to comply with ethical and legal restrictions. The main such information
is the IP address from which each query was made, but text queries also contain
personal information: some individuals enter their name or their friends’ names,
phone numbers, or even credit card numbers as search-strings [1, 2, 3, 19]. Fi-
nally, users interested in rare contents may enter very specific keywords, usable
for identifying them.
Anonymisation of internet traces is a subtle issue in itself [1, 3, 19]. The chal-
lenge consists in obtaining rich data while fully preserving user privacy. Relying
on state-of-the-art knowledge, we set up an appropriate anonymisation proce-
dure which we describe below. We applied it independently to both datasets
(as it had to be performed at measurement time).
First notice that anonymising IP addresses with a hash code is not satisfac-
tory: one may decode addresses by applying the function to the 232 possible
addresses. Likewise, encryption relying on a secret key is unsure on such data.
We therefore chose to encode addresses according to their order of appearance
in the captured data: we replace the first observed IP address by 0, the se-
cond by 1 and so on. We proceed similarly for connection port numbers. This
anonymisation is consistent: we always replace a same IP address or port by the
same integer. Although computationally expensive, it has three key advantages:
it ensures a very strong anonymisation level, it is feasible in real-time during
the measurement (which is mandatory), and it makes further use of the dataset
much easier.
We apply the following scheme to keyword-based queries. First we replace
all accented characters by the corresponding unaccented letter. Then we convert
all characters to lower-case, replace all non-alphanumeric characters by a space,
and remove successive spaces. We call the obtained queries normalised queries.
They contain only series of alphanumeric characters separated by spaces, which
we call words.
In order to anonymise this normalised data, we have to distinguish between
personal (sensitive) and general (non-sensitive) information. We assume that a
same word entered by many users (and thus in many queries) is not sensitive
[1, 3]. For instance, a sensitive name or phone number would appear only in a
few queries, or in many queries but entered by a same user. We finally remove all
words appearing in normalised queries from less than 50 distinct IP addresses,
which ensures a very high level of anonymisation.
Numbers, in particular short numbers, tend to appear in many contexts.
They therefore appear in clear after the procedure above, which raises anonymi-
sation concerns. In particular, phone numbers often appear as space-separated
series of two or three digits, which appear in queries from more than 50 IP
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addresses and so are not removed. A solution would be to remove all numbers,
but keeping such information is crucial here as they often indicate ages in pae-
dophile queries, see Section 3.1. We therefore decided to remove numbers of
more than two digits, and numbers with value greater than 16. This hides most
numbers while keeping the age information we need.
Finally, short words raise similar concern. In particular, charset encoding
problems sometimes lead to strings where a blank space is inserted between any
two consecutive characters. Single characters are then considered as words, and
they will most probably appear frequently. In the procedure above, this means
that the corresponding queries will appear in clear. To avoid this, we remove
all words composed of only one letter. Removing words with only two or three
letters would also make sense, but this would discard important information,
see Section 3.1. Inspection of our data showed that keeping them raises no
significant anonymisation concern.
Figure 3 presents two examples of queries, and their counterparts after the
normalisation and anonymisation procedures.
Photo Scarlett O’Hara e´te´ “Champs-E´lyse´es”
→֒ photo scarlett o hara ete champs elysees
→֒ photo scarlett hara ete champs elysees
Credit card 1234 4567 7654 4321 johndoe7643@something.com
→֒ credit card 1234 4567 7654 4321 johndoe7643 something com
→֒ credit card something com
Figure 3: Two queries presented in their raw, normalised and anonymised ver-
sions, from top to bottom. Raw queries are italicised.
In the first query, accented letters are first replaced by their non-accented coun-
terparts. All letters are transformed into lower-case, the apostrophe and quo-
tation marks are replaced by spaces. We obtain a normalised query. The sub-
sequent anonymisation procedure only removes the remaining o, now a single-
letter word.
In the second query, the normalisation consists of putting the text in lower-case
and replacing the arobace and dot by spaces. The anonymisation then removes
the 4-digit groups, and johndoe7643, a word not sufficiently common to appear
in queries from more than 50 distinct IP addresses. Consecutive spaces are
eventually trimmed.
3 Detecting paedophile queries
In this section we design a tool for automatic identification of paedophile queries
in large sets of queries, most of which are not paedophile. The standard way
for doing so is to use machine learning approaches, which rely on the prior
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knowledge of a representative set of paedophile queries. No such dataset is
currently available, though, and constructing it without an automatic tool would
require expert inspection of huge sets of queries, which is by far too time-
consuming and costly.
We therefore rely on domain knowledge of paedophile keywords and ad hoc
observations to manually design our tool (Section 3.1). Such a tool is necessarily
prone to errors: some paedophile queries may not be tagged as such, and some
non-paedophile queries may be tagged as paedophile. It is therefore crucial
to obtain precise estimates of our error rates in order to make quantification of
paedophile activity possible. This raises specific challenges in our context, which
we address in Section 3.2. We then set up an assessment framework which we
submit to several independent and highly qualified experts (Section 3.3). Using
the results of this assessment (Section 3.4), we finally obtain reliable estimates
of our tool’s error rates (Section 3.5).
3.1 Tool design
Our tool for detecting paedophile queries consists in performing a series of sim-
ple lexical tests (matchings of keywords in queries), each aimed at detecting
paedophile queries of a specific form. We built a first set of rules based on
our expertise in the paedophile context acquired for several years of work on
the topic with law-enforcement personnel [28]. We then manually inspected the
results, identified some errors, and corrected them by adding minor variants
to these general rules. We iterated this until obtained improvements became
negligible.
We describe out final rules below, and outline the detection steps in Figure 4.
no familyparents and
familychild and sex ?
matches
tag as not paedophile
?and sex
matches
child
yes yes no
explicit ?
matches no
query
yes yes
with age<17 andno
sex or child( )?
matches agesuffix
tag as paedophile
Figure 4: Sequence of tests performed by our tool. Each matching consists in
detecting if the query contains words from specific sets (named explicit, child,
sex, familyparents, familychild, and agesuffix). See [28] for these sets of keywords
and the tool source code.
According to experts of paedophile activity, some keywords point out ex-
clusively such activity in P2P systems, i.e. they have no other meaning and
are dedicated to the search of paedophile content. Typical examples include
qqaazz, r@ygold, or hussyfan. We therefore built a list of specific keywords,
called explicit, and we tag any query containing at least one word from this list
as paedophile.
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Many paedophile queries contain words related to children or childhood and
words related to sexuality, such as child and sex. We therefore constructed a
list of keywords related to childhood, called child, and a list of keywords related
to sexuality, called sex. We tag any query containing a keyword in both lists as
paedophile. Notice that this may be misleading in some cases, for instance for
queries like destinys child sexy daddy (a song descriptor).
A variant of this rule, which we added to the two previous ones, consists in
tagging as paedophile the queries containing words related to family, denoting
parents and children (stored in two lists called familyparents and familychild),
and a word from the sex list.
Finally, many queries contain age indications under the form n yo, generally
meaning that the user is seeking content involving n years old children. Other
suffixes also appear in place of yo: yr, years old, etc. We identified such suf-
fixes and built a list named agesuffix. Age indications are strong indicators of
paedophile queries, but they are not sufficient in themselves: they also occur
in many non-paedophile queries (for example when the user seeks a computer
game for children). We decided to tag a query as paedophile if it contains age
indication lower than 17 (greater ages appear in many non-paedophile queries)
and a word in the sex or child lists.
In all situations above, although most keywords are in English, local language
variations occur, in particular French, German, Spanish, and Italian versions.
A few queries in rarer languages, such as Russian and Chinese, also occur. We
included the most frequent translations in our sets of keywords.
We provide the exact rules implemented in our tool (including the sets of
keywords we use) and the tool itself at [28].
3.2 Method for tool assessment
Let us consider a set Q of queries, and let us denote by P+ (resp. P−) the set
of paedophile (resp. non-paedophile) queries in Q. Let us denote by T+ (resp.
T−) the subset of Q which is tagged as paedophile (resp. non-paedophile) by
our tool. Figure 5 provides an illustration of our notations.
Ideally, we would have T+ = P+, which would mean that our tool makes
no mistake. In practice, though, there are in general paedophile queries which
our tool mis-identifies, i.e. queries in T− ∩ P+. Such queries are called false
negatives (the tool produces an erroneous negative answer for them). False
positives, i.e. queries in T+∩P−, are defined dually. These notions are classical
in data mining, see for instance [8].
The numbers of false positives and false negatives describe the performance
of our tool on Q. Notice however that they strongly depend on the size of P+
and P−. In our situation, we expect P+ to be much smaller than P− (most
queries are not paedophile), which automatically leads to small numbers of false
negatives, even in the extreme (and useless) case where the tool would give only
negative answers.
To evaluate the performance of a tool in such situations, two natural notions
of false positive and false negative rates coexist. Both will prove to be useful
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non−paedophile queries
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P+T U )(
false negatives
correctly detected
paedophile queries
false positives
Q
Figure 5: Illustration of our notations. The ellipse represents the set of all
queries, Q. The vertical line labelled P−/P+ divides Q into the set of non-
paedophile queries P− (left) and the set of paedophile queries P+ (right). Like-
wise, the vertical line labelled T−/T+ divides Q into the set of queries tagged
as non-paedophile by the tool, T− (left), and the set of queries it tags as pae-
dophile, T+ (right).
here.
First, one may consider the false negative (resp. positive) rate when all
inspected queries are paedophile (resp. non-paedophile):
f− =
|T− ∩ P+|
|P+|
and f+ =
|T+ ∩ P−|
|P−|
.
An estimate of f+ may then be obtained by sampling a random subset X of
P− (i.e. random non-paedophile queries) and manually inspecting the results
of the tool on X . Constructing X is easy: as most queries are non-paedophile,
one may sample random queries and then manually discard the ones which are
paedophile. As long as X is small, this has a reasonable cost. However, the
fraction of queries in X which will be tagged as paedophile by our tool will be
extremely small. As a consequence, an estimate of f+ obtained this way would
be of poor quality.
Conversely, an estimate of f− may be obtained by sampling a random subset
X of P+ (i.e. random paedophile queries) and manually inspecting the results
of the tool on X . As P+ is very small and unknown, sampling X is a difficult
task. We may however approximate it using the notion of neighbour queries as
follows.
Given a query q in Q, its backward neighbour is the last query in Q which
was received from the same IP address as q less than two hours before q, if it
exists 1. We therefore expect it was entered by the same user as q, seeking the
1We chose this threshold after examining the distributions of query interarrival times; it
must be large enough to lead to many cases where neighbour queries exist, while being small
enough to make it probable that neighbours of a query are related to this query. To this
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same kind of content 2. Likewise, we define the forward neighbour of q as the
first query in Q which was received from the same IP address as q within two
hours after q.
We denote by N(q) the set containing the backward and forward neighbours
of a query q. This set may be empty, and contains at most two elements. We
denote by N(S) = ∪q∈SN(q) the set of neighbour queries of all queries in set S,
for any S. We guess that queries in N(P+), i.e. the neighbours of paedophile
queries, are also paedophile with high probability (much higher than random
queries in Q). We expect this to be also true for queries in N(T+), which is
confirmed in Section 3.4, Table 4.
Obviously, N(T+) ∩ P+ ⊆ P+, but N(T+) ∩ P+ 6⊆ T+ in general. In other
words, N(T+) probably contains queries in P+ (i.e. paedophile queries) which
are not detected by our tool. If we consider the queries in N(T+) ∩ P+ as
random paedophile queries, then they may be sampled to construct a set X
of random paedophile queries suitable for estimating f−. As X contains only
paedophile queries, this estimate is equal to the number of queries in X not
detected as paedophile by our tool divided by the size of X .
Notice that the queries in X may actually be biased by the fact that they
are derived from T+: the probability that a user enters a paedophile query
which the tool is able to detect is higher if this user already entered one such
query (he/she may enter in both cases keywords detected by our tool). As a
consequence, our estimate of f− may be an under-estimate.
Finally, one cannot, in our context, evaluate f+ properly; on the contrary,
we are able to give a reasonable (under-)estimate for f−. But both f+ and f−
are needed to evaluate the performance of our tool.
In order to bypass this issue, we consider the following variants of false
negative and false positive rates, which capture the probability that the tool
gives an erroneous answer when it gives a positive (resp. negative) one:
f ′+ =
|T+ ∩ P−|
|T+|
and f ′− =
|T− ∩ P+|
|T−|
.
An estimate of f ′+ may be obtained by sampling a random subset X of T+
(i.e. a random set of queries for which our tool gives a positive answer) and by
manually inspecting this subset in order to obtain the number of false positives.
We expect all sets involved in these computations to be of significant size (which
is confirmed in Section 3.4), so there is no obstacle in computing a reasonable
estimate for f ′+.
regard, two hours is a good compromise (which we confirm in Section 3.4, Table 4), but a
wide range of values around this specific value lead to similar observations. The value we chose
for the threshold is consistent with the conclusions of [4], a study dedicated to inter-query
times in eDonkey.
2IP addresses are not enough to distinguish between users (see Section 5) but many neigh-
bours of paedophile queries are themselves paedophile (see Section 3.4, Table 4), which is what
we need.
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Conversely, an estimate of f ′− may be obtained by sampling a random subset
X of T− and inspect it to determine the number of false negatives, i.e. the
number of queries in X which actually are paedophile. However, as paedophile
queries are expected to be very rare, the number of observed false negatives will
be extremely small as long as X is of reasonable size.
Therefore, one may easily obtain a significant estimate of f ′+, but computing
a reasonable estimate for f ′− is not tractable in our case.
Finally, the quantities we will use for evaluating the quality of our tool are
f ′+ (the rate of errors when our tool decides that a query is paedophile) and f−
(the rate of paedophile queries that our tool mis-classifies as non-paedophile),
which we are able to properly estimate. We describe our practical procedure for
computing these estimates in the following sections and provide the obtained
estimates in Section 3.5.
3.3 Assessment setup
In order to apply the method for quantifying our tool quality described above,
we need to identify actual paedophile queries in some specific sets. To do so, we
resort to independent experts of paedophile activity who manually inspect and
tag these queries. We describe here the construction of these sets, the experts
who helped us, and the interface we provided to them.
Query selection
Because the 2009 dataset was not yet available when we designed our tool and
assessed it, we used the 2007 dataset for sampling queries to assess. We denote
by Q the whole set of queries, and use the formalism of Section 3.2. We divide
Q into three sets (with overlap): T− (queries tagged as not paedophile by our
tool), T+ (queries it tagged as paedophile), and N(T+) (neighbours of queries
it tagged as paedophile). These three sets are easy to compute from Q using
our tool.
Notice that some queries in T+, i.e. some queries which are tagged as pae-
dophile by the tool, are composed of only one word. Then, this word is neces-
sarily a word in the explicit paedophile keywords list described in Section 3.1.
These keywords are known to have a very strong paedophile nature. Therefore,
if such a keyword appears alone in a query, then this query surely is paedophile.
We therefore increase the efficiency of our assessment by not submitting these
one-keyword queries to experts. We denote by T+1 the set of queries in this
set, and by T+>1 the queries in T
+ composed of more than one word. Our op-
timisation consists in using the fact that T+1 ⊆ P
+, and so use only T+>1 for
assessment.
We finally construct the sets of queries to assess by selecting 1, 000 random
queries in each of the sets T−, T+>1 and N(T
+) (thus 3, 000 queries in total 3).
3Since there is an overlap between N(T+) and the other sets, we could have sampled
some queries more than once, leading to less than 3, 000 queries in total. Since 1, 000 is small
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This leads to three subsets which we denote by T−, T+>1, and N(T
+) respec-
tively. Notice that carefully tagging 3, 000 queries already is a heavy task for
experts. For this reason, we did not reproduce the assessment on the 2009
dataset and simply checked manually that its outcome would be very similar.
Experts
Once we selected sets of queries for which we need expert classification, the
choice of experts is a crucial step. Indeed, deep knowledge of online paedophile
activity is needed, if possible with a focus on P2P activity and/or query ana-
lysis. Such expertise is extremely rare, even at the international level. It is
present mainly in law-enforcement institutions, where special units are devoted
to fighting (online) paedophile activity, and in NGOs dedicated to similar tasks
(but with a different approach, in general). Some security consultants also have
this kind of knowledge.
Thanks to our involvement in international research projects on paedophile
activity for several years, with partners in various law-enforcement agencies and
NGOs in several countries, we were able to contact a large number of specialists
who may play the role of experts in our study. We were for instance able to
send a call for experts on the main international mailing-list of law-enforcement
personnel working on cybercrime.
We finally obtained a set of 21 volunteers for participating to our assessment
task. These participants are personnel of various law-enforcement institutions
(including Europol and the main French and Danish national agencies) and
well-established NGOs (including the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children, Nobody’s Children Foundation, Action Innocence Monaco and the In-
ternational Association of Internet Hotlines). A few security consultants also
contributed.
We later conducted an assessment of participants themselves to ensure that
we use only answers from relevant experts, see Section 3.4.
Interface
We set up a web interface to make it convenient for participants to tag queries.
All 3, 000 queries were presented in a different random order for each participant,
thus avoiding possible bias due to a specific order. Moreover, it was possible
for participants to tag only a part of the 3, 000 proposed queries, thus allowing
them to contribute even if they had limited time.
We proposed five possible answers for each query: paedophile, probably pae-
dophile, probably not paedophile, not paedophile, and I don’t know. To help
participant’s choice, we displayed each query with its backward and forward
neighbours (defined in Section 3.2), when they existed. This was of great help
in tagging ambiguous queries.
compared to the total sizes of the three sets, this did not happen here.
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3.4 Expert results
The answers collected from our 21 participants are summarised in Table 2. Each
of them tagged more than 300 queries (i.e. 10% of the whole), and 12 tagged
more than 2,000.
prob. don’t prob. not
paedo paedo know not paedo total relevance
1530 149 25 66 1230 3000 99.6
1381 247 125 580 667 3000 98.5
1679 89 2 113 1117 3000 99.2
1603 201 99 174 923 3000 99.3
1598 5 15 1 1381 3000 98.9
128 81 1 26 124 360 96.3
216 154 0 142 132 644 98.6
1624 126 16 165 581 2512 99.7
351 16 2 16 27 412 99.6
647 119 71 40 439 1316 98.9
1174 111 20 64 789 2158 99.3
335 17 1 70 166 589 97.1
641 383 4 112 753 1893 96.6
1071 546 2 453 928 3000 87.3
1554 197 28 327 894 3000 98.2
305 270 24 89 181 869 98.3
371 1017 496 570 546 3000 95.7
976 936 405 594 89 3000 95.5
344 12 10 70 156 592 99.0
845 139 323 175 182 1664 98.1
1506 120 6 25 393 2050 98.3
Table 2: Assessement results for each participant. Each line corresponds to
a participant, and gives the number of answers of each kind he/she provided,
his/her total number of answer, and his/her relevance.
Expert selection
Despite our efforts to select appropriate contributors, some may have an inade-
quate knowledge of our particular context (paedophile queries in a P2P system),
and lower the quality of our results by entering erroneous answers. In order to
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identify such cases, we examined the answers of each participant to the queries
which contain an explicit paedophile keyword, i.e. a word in our explicit list
(defined in Section 3.1). As already said, these keywords are well acknowledged
paedophile keywords, which all experts of the field consider as strong indicators
of paedophile queries.
The set of all queries submitted to contributors contains 1,003 queries which
contain at least one explicit paedophile keyword. We provide in Table 2 (right-
most column) the percentage of these queries which the corresponding contribu-
tor tagged as paedophile or probably paedophile. For all contributors except one,
this percentage is above 95%, thus showing that these contributors recognise
these keywords. The remaining contributor only slightly disagrees with a ratio
of 87.3%.
The ratios discussed above may be misleading if a contributor tags all or
almost all queries as paedophile. Table 2 gives precise insight on this. The
answers of most contributors are well balanced between all possible answers,
except for three contributors (see for instance the last line of Table 2). Manual
inspection shows that these contributors focused preferentially on paedophile
queries (they did not tag all queries), which does not invalidate their answers.
We therefore keep them in our expert set.
Finally, we obtain 42,059 answers provided by 21 experts who contributed
at least 300 answers each. This leads to an average of slightly more than 14
experts assessing each query, which is sufficient for our purpose.
random subset
T− T+>1 N(T
+)
paedophile 63 11,530 8,286
probably paedophile 237 2,303 2,395
I don’t know 1,009 208 458
probably not paedophile 2,294 336 1,242
not paedophile 9,537 241 1,920
Total 13,140 14,618 14,301
Table 3: Number of votes of each kind for each considered set.
The distribution of these answers among the queries of each considered set
is given in Table 3. It is in accordance with what one would expect if our
tool performs well, and if our assumption that N(T+) should contain many
paedophile queries is verified. We analyse this in more details now.
Classification of queries
For each query q submitted to experts in our assessment procedure, we denote
by q++ the fraction of experts (among the ones who provided an answer for q)
which tagged it as paedophile and by q+ the fraction of experts which tagged
it as paedophile or probably paedophile. We define q− and q−− dually. Notice
that q+ + q− < 1 in general, as some I don’t know answers were provided (the
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fraction of such answers is 1 − q+ − q−). Moreover, q+ ≥ q++ and q− ≥ q−−
for all q.
In order to classify queries according to expert answers, we expect to observe
that each query q has either a high q+ (resp. q++) or a high q− (resp. q−−),
but not both or neither, meaning that experts agree on the nature of q. Figure 6
displays the difference between q+ and q− and between q++ and q−− for all
queries. These plots grow very slowly for small values on the horizontal axis,
showing that only very few queries have a small difference. On the contrary,
for many queries, the difference is very large: above 0.8 for 1, 305 queries (over
3, 000) in the case of q++ and q−−, and for 2, 308 queries in the case of q+ and
q−.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 q
ue
rie
s
absolute value of the difference
|q++ - q-- ||q+ - q-|
Figure 6: The cumulative distribution (CDF) of the absolute value of differ-
ences between q++ and q−− and between q+ and q− for each query: a point at
coordinate (x, y) means that a fraction y of queries have a difference lower than
x.
Only 41 queries have a difference |q+ − q−| smaller than or equal to 0.1,
which already is significant. Moreover, this number increases very slowly when
the difference grows. We therefore classify a query as paedophile if q+−q− > 0.1
and as non-paedophile otherwise. We finally obtain the query classification by
experts presented in Table 4.
random subset
T− T+>1 N(T
+)
paedophile queries 1 985 754
non-paedophile queries 999 15 246
Table 4: Number of queries classified as paedophile or not by experts for each
considered set.
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3.5 Tool assessment results
Thanks to the assessment results in Table 4 and the expressions given in Sec-
tion 3.2, we may now compute estimates of the false positive and false negative
rates which describe the quality of our tool.
First notice that, as expected, the number of paedophile queries in the set
of queries tagged as non-paedophile by the tool is very low: |T− ∩ P+| = 1. As
a consequence, approximating f ′− = |T
−∩P+|
|T−| by
|T−∩P+|
|T−|
= 11,000 would yield
very poor quality result.
The estimate obtained for f ′+ is of much better quality. It relies on the
following expression:
f ′+ = |T
+∩P−|
|T+|
=
|T+
1
∩P−|+|T+
>1
∩P−|
|T+|
=
|T+
>1
∩P−|
|T+|
(since T+1 ∩ P
− = ∅, because all queries in T+1 are paedophile, see Section 3.3).
An estimate of |T+>1 ∩ P
−| is given by |T+>1 ∩ P
−| ·
|T+
>1
|
|T+
>1
|
which leads to:
f ′+ ∼
|T+
>1
∩P−|
|T+| ·
|T+
>1
|
|T+
>1
|
= 15207,340 ·
192,545
1,000
∼ 1.39%.
The quality of this estimate is good not only because |T+>1 ∩ P
−| = 15 is
significant, but also because we evaluate it using a sample of queries in T+>1,
which is much (more than 500 times) smaller than T−, involved in the estimate
of f ′−.
Conversely, the assessment results confirm that estimating f+ = |T
+∩P−|
|P−|
with our data would yield poor quality approximate, as |T+ ∩ P−| is small
(there are very few paedophile queries), as well as the sample size, compared to
the size of P−.
It is possible to estimate f− much more accurately:
f− = |T
−∩P+|
|P+|
&
|T−∩(N(T+)∩P+)|
|N(T+)∩P+|
= 185754
∼ 24.5%.
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This value however is an under-estimate, because we assessed neighbours
of detected paedophile queries instead of random paedophile queries. It is
equal to the probability that our tool erroneously tags such a neighbour as
non-paedophile. There is no a priori reason to suppose that this leads to huge
differences, though, and we therefore expect this bound to be reasonably tight.
We will handle this with care in the following.
4 Fraction of paedophile queries
In this section, we estimate the fraction of paedophile queries in our two datasets,
i.e. |P
+|
|Q| for each Q (we use the notations defined in Section 3.2, the dataset
under concern being given by the context). This may be done by sampling a
random subset of Q and then submit the queries it contains to experts able
to decide whether they are paedophile or not. As we expect that P+ is very
small compared to Q (the fraction of paedophile queries is low), though, this
is not feasible in practice: the size of a random set large enough to contain a
representative number of paedophile queries is prohibitive for manual inspection.
We therefore use here the automatic paedophile query detection tool de-
signed in Section 3, for which precise information on its error rates is available.
We first estimate the fraction of queries in Q tagged as paedophile by the tool,
and then infer from it an estimate of the fraction |P
+|
|Q| .
4.1 Fraction of automatically detected queries
The automatic paedophile query detection tool divides Q into two disjoint sub-
sets: T+, the set of queries tagged as paedophile by the tool; and T−, the set
of queries tagged as non-paedophile. We estimate here the fraction of queries
tagged as paedophile, i.e. |T
+|
|Q| , in both datasets.
This may be trivially obtained by computing the set T+ of queries tagged
as paedophile by the tool, and then divide it by the total number of queries.
We obtain this way ratios slightly above 0.19% for both datasets. In order to
ensure the relevance of this estimate, though, we go into details below.
We first check that the measurement duration is large enough by plotting
the fraction of queries tagged as paedophile as a function of the measurement
duration, see Figure 7. It clearly shows that this fraction converges rapidly to a
reasonably steady value, slightly below 0.2%; changing this value significantly
would need a drastic change in the data.
Going further, we plot in Figure 8 the cumulative distribution of the fraction
of queries tagged as paedophile in all relevant one-hour, 6-hour, 12-hour and 24-
hour slices of the measurements 4. This clearly shows that there is a notion of
4Long-term measurements are subject to interruptions (server or network failures of up-
grades, for instance). As a consequence, some time slices in the measurements are not signif-
icant (no or few queries are captured during these slices), and thus we discard them when we
compute slice statistics.
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Figure 7: Fraction of paedophile queries detected in our datasets as a function
of the measurement duration.
normal, or median behaviour for each slice size, and that it is quite independent
of slice sizes. The averages of these distributions are all close to 0.2%, in
accordance with our previous computations.
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of the fraction of paedophile queries observed
in time-slices of 1, 6, 12 and 24 hours (each plot corresponds to a size of time
slice). A point at coordinates (x, y) means that we observed a fraction y of
slices with less than a fraction x of paedophile queries. A sharp vertical increase
around x therefore indicates that many slices were observed with a fraction of
paedophile queries close to x.
Finally, we conclude that the fraction of queries tagged as paedophile by our
tool may be approximated by |T
+|
|Q| ∼ 0.2% in both datasets.
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4.2 Inference
We established in Section 3.5 reliable estimates for f− and f ′+. As a conse-
quence, we have to infer the size of P+ from these rates, which may be done as
follows:
|P+| = |P+ ∩ T+|+ |P+ ∩ T−|
= |T+|(1− f ′+) + |P+|f−
and so
|P+| =
|T+|(1− f ′+)
1− f−
.
Using f− & 24.5% and f ′+ ∼ 1.39% (Section 3.5), we obtain:
|P+|
|Q|
& 0.25%
for both datasets.
In other words, at least one query over 400 is paedophile in our two datasets.
Notice that taking f− ∼ 50%, which most certainly is a huge over-estimate,
leads to a ratio of approximately 0.38% paedophile queries. We therefore con-
clude that the true ratio is not much larger than 0.25%.
5 Fraction of paedophile users
Although the fraction of paedophile queries is of high interest in itself, the
key question when quantifying paedophile activity actually is the fraction of
paedophile users, which we define as users who entered at least one paedophile
query.
However, identifying a user in an internet-like environment is a challenge in
itself [5, 27]. Any computer is identified by an IP address at a given time, but
even this may change and we are unable in general to detect that a same com-
puter has two different addresses at different times and/or that two computers
use the same address. In addition, a same user may use several computers, and
several users may use the same computer, making identification of users even
more challenging.
More precisely, the following situations occur:
• several computers in a local network are connected to the internet through
a gateway or firewall which performs network address translation (NAT):
they all appear to have the IP address of the gateway or firewall, which is
responsible for redistributing the traffic coming from the internet (using
ports);
• internet service providers (ISP) may allocate IP addresses dynamically, i.e.
allocate different addresses to a same computer when it connects to the
internet at different times, and also allocate the same address to different
computers during time;
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• in various places where public internet access is provided (internet cafes,
parks, libraries, etc.) or at home, different users (temporarily) have the
same address;
• and dually, a same user may use several computers (at home, at work, in
public places, etc.).
This makes user identification at a large scale extremely challenging, and
even impossible in practice. Notice however that, in our context, what we need
is slightly weaker: we need to make the difference between two users in our
dataset in order to avoid mixing their queries.
Indeed, mixing the queries of several users would lead to interpret the cor-
responding series of queries as a unique series, and thus a unique user. As we
consider a user as paedophile as soon as he/she entered one paedophile query, if
one of the corresponding users entered paedophile queries, then the whole series
is considered as coming from a paedophile user. Notice that since the overall
fraction of users entering paedophile queries is very small, it is very unlikely
that two paedophile users are mixed in this way. Therefore, mixing the queries
of several users leads to a decrease of the total number of observed users, but in
general the number of observed paedophile users stays the same. This leads to
an over-estimate of the fraction of paedophile users. We call this phenomenon
pollution, and we observe this in practice below.
We explore below different approaches to count users who sent paedophile
queries in our datasets. First, we show that identifying users with their IP
address only is not sufficient, but that considering the pair composed of their IP
address and their connection port provides relevant information. We then study
the influence of the measurement duration using sliding windows of different
lengths: the bias due to dynamic addressing may be controlled with such an
approach. Finally, we consider series of queries received from a same IP address
with small inter-query times, which we call sessions. Indeed, the fraction of
sessions containing paedophile queries may be considered as an estimate of the
fraction of users entering such queries.
5.1 IP addresses and connection port numbers
Two pieces of information in our datasets may lead to distinguish between users:
the IP address from which they sent queries, and the connection port number
they used. The latter is important: it makes it possible to distinguish between
several users in a same local network with a NAT.
Therefore, we consider here two approximations of the notion of user: we first
assume that the IP address is sufficient to distinguish between different users,
and then that the pair (IP address, connection port) is sufficient. Notice that
this last assumption is necessarily better than the previous one, but comparing
the two is enlightening.
We display in Figure 9 the fraction of IP addresses and (IP, port) pairs
from which at least one paedophile query (as detected by our tool) was entered.
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We call them paedophile IP and paedophile (IP, port) pairs for simplification.
Notice that only IP addresses are available in the 2009 dataset.
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Figure 9: Fraction of paedophile users detected in our datasets as a function of
the measurement duration.
For both datasets, the fraction of paedophile IP addresses clearly grows with
the measurement duration. This reveals the pollution phenomenon sketched
above: as IP addresses may correspond to different users over time, and as
one paedophile user is sufficient to make us consider the corresponding address
as paedophile, then the probability for any given address to be considered as
paedophile grows with measurement time (all IP addresses may eventually be
considered as paedophile). This confirms that using IP address alone is mis-
leading in this case.
On the other hand, the fraction of paedophile (IP, port) pairs in the 2007
dataset has a very different behaviour: it rapidly reaches a steady regime, very
similar to the fraction of paedophile queries studied in Section 4, Figure 7.
This shows that pollution due to dynamic allocation of addresses and ports is
negligible in this case.
We finally conclude that the fraction of paedophile (IP, ports) pairs is meaning-
ful, and that this fraction is slightly above 0.22% here.
5.2 Varying measurement duration
Figure 9 shows that increasing the measurement duration leads to an increase of
the pollution of IP addresses by paedophile users. Therefore, considering shorter
measurement windows leads to a better handling of the pollution phenomena.
On the other hand, this leads to less observed data, and therefore to less reliable
results.
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To study this, we divide our datasets into small measurement windows, and
compute the observed fraction of paedophile IP addresses or (IP, port) pairs for
all windows. The distribution of these fractions for all windows (not presented
here) are homogeneous, and therefore their mean is representative. We present
in Figure 10 this mean as a function of the window size.
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Figure 10: Fraction of paedophile users as a function of the measurement
window size.
The fraction of paedophile (IP, port) pairs for the 2007 dataset first fluctuates
for small window sizes, and quickly converges to a steady regime, very close to
the overall fraction of paedophile (IP, port) pairs in the dataset. Notice that
it is possible that a same (IP, port) pair corresponds to several users (family
computers, for instance). However, the probability that this happens within
a short time span is greatly reduced. The fact that the fraction of paedophile
(IP, port) pairs in windows of limited duration is very close to the overall fraction
therefore shows that it is close to the fraction of actual detected users.
This is confirmed by the fraction of paedophile IP addresses as a function
of the window size. After some initial fluctuations, this value drops to slightly
less than 0.25%, then increases linearly with the window size 5. Considering
shorter windows therefore reduces temporal pollution. At any given time there
are nonetheless several users simultaneously using the same IP address, because
they are behind a NAT for instance. They will however use different ports,
which is why the fraction of paedophile (IP, port) pairs is always lower than the
fraction of paedophile IP addresses.
The plot for the fraction of paedophile IP addresses in the 2009 dataset
has the same behaviour as for the 2007 dataset, but is larger than it. This
5This increase is not obvious on the figure because the slope is very small. If the x axis
extended to the whole 10 weeks of measurement though, the plot would reach 0.38% which
is the overall fraction of paedophile IP addresses in the dataset.
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could be because the fraction of paedophile users is larger than in the 2007
dataset. However, as the fraction of paedophile queries in both datasets are
very similar, we suspect that this is because more users use the same IP address
simultaneously in 2009 than in 2007.
5.3 Sessions
A session is a maximal set of queries from the same IP address (or (IP, port)
pair) such that two consecutive queries are not separated by more than a given
delay δ. Studying sessions reduces temporal pollution, as there will probably be
a gap between the queries of two users who use the same IP address successively.
On the other hand, there is no a priori reason why paedophile users would make
more sessions than other users, and so we consider the fraction of paedophile
sessions as an approximation of the fraction of paedophile users.
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Figure 11: Fraction of paedophile sessions as a function of δ, the maximal delay
between two consecutive queries in a same session.
We present in Figure 11 the fraction of paedophile sessions for different
choices of δ. The fraction of paedophile sessions for very small values of δ is not
relevant, because series of queries entered by a same user then belong to several
sessions. For large values of δ, this fraction becomes closer and closer to the
overall fraction of paedophile users in the dataset 6. This again confirms that
considering IP addresses and connection ports seems to be enough to identify
users in this dataset.
The fraction of paedophile sessions corresponding to IP addresses is higher.
This again comes from the fact that several users are simultaneously connected
from the same IP address, but do not use the same port.
6If δ is equal to the measurement duration, all queries entered from the same IP address
or (IP, port) pair will belong to a single session.
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The fraction of paedophile sessions is larger for the 2009 dataset than for
the 2007 dataset. Again, we conjecture that this is because a higher number of
users use simultaneously the same IP address.
5.4 Inference
The fact that the three methods used above for user quantification are in accor-
dance shows that considering (IP, port) pairs is relevant for identifying users in
our context. The fraction of such users entering queries detected as paedophile
by our tool is equal to 0.22% in the 2007 dataset. We now use the false positive
and false negative rates of our tool to infer the actual fraction of paedophile
users.
These rates give the number of queries that the tool mis-classified. However,
since we do not know which precise queries are mis-classified, we do not know
what fractions of users they represent. If queries were mis-classified with uniform
probability, they would correspond to a similar fraction of users. This is however
probably not true, as a same user tends to enter similar queries. Therefore, if
one of his/her queries is mis-classified, probably many others are.
We however establish, using the false positive rate, a lower bound for the
fraction of paedophile users. A fraction f ′+ of the queries detected as paedophile
by the tool are in fact not paedophile, which represents a given number n of
queries. Clearly, the corresponding number of users which the tool mis-identified
as paedophile is at most n (it is equal to n if all mis-identified queries are entered
by different users). Conversely, the tool failed to detect some paedophile queries.
If all these queries were entered by users who were nonetheless detected as
paedophile (because they entered other paedophile queries which were correctly
identified), then no paedophile user is missed. The tool detected |T+| = 207, 340
paedophile queries in the 2007 dataset, which correspond to 112,712 different
users. The number of queries erroneously tagged as paedophile is |T+| · f ′+ =
2, 882. Finally, the number of paedophile users is at least 112, 712 − 2, 882 =
109, 830, which leads to a fraction of paedophile users slightly lower than 0.22%.
It is not possible to establish such a lower bound for the fraction of paedophile
users in the 2009 dataset, because we do not have access to the connection ports
of the users. However, we observe that when we reduce the pollution caused by
users successively using the same IP address (by studying measurement windows
and sessions, see Figures 10 and 11), the obtained values are close for both
datasets, but larger for the 2009 dataset. We therefore estimate that a lower
bound of 0.2% of paedophile users applies to both datasets.
6 Related work
Collection and analysis of large P2P traces is a very active field. Studies mainly
focus on peer properties which are useful for protocol design, such as their
connection time, sharing behaviour, or similarity regarding searched files and
geographical location, see for instance [10, 11, 20, 23]. Some works also analyse
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queries entered by users [9, 15] but consider limited statistics (typically query
length, number, interarrival time or redundancy). Only very few studies exa-
mine user interests in detail [12, 24, 26]. Besides, classification of search queries
is an active field, with articles such as [25] in which authors aim at identifying
the proportion of sexually-related web queries.
On the other hand, many papers discuss the amount and features of pae-
dophile activity in P2P systems but they rely on very small datasets collected
manually (typically by entering a few queries and examining obtained results),
e.g. [7, 16, 29]. They aim at establishing the alarming presence of paedophile
activity in P2P systems, not at quantifying it, and as such cannot be compared
to our work.
Up to our knowledge, only two papers deal with the quantification of pae-
dophile activity in a P2P system in a similar way as the work presented here
[12, 26]. Both analyse Gnutella traces containing keyword-based queries.
In [12] the authors consider three sets of 10, 000 queries captured during three
consecutive sundays in 2005. Two reviewers (whose qualifications are unknown)
manually classified these queries as related to either illegal pornographic content
or not (they do not focus specifically on paedophile queries, but also include
incest, rape and bestiality). They conclude that 1.6% of the observed queries are
related to illegal pornography. However their dataset is very small and therefore
contains a very low number of paedophile queries, thus limiting the significance
of these statistics. Moreover, their methodology for query classification is not
automated nor fully specified, and it relies on two reviewers only.
Further work of this group on the same dataset proposes techniques for au-
tomatic discovery of paedophile keywords [13]. However, as already explained,
applying such methods in our context requires a significant set of known pae-
dophile queries, which was not available before our work. Using such methods
to improve our results is one of our main perspectives.
In [26] the author considers a set of 235, 513 queries, which is approximately
1, 000 times smaller than our datasets (again, given the small rate of paedophile
queries in such datasets, this leads to estimates with limited statistical signifi-
cance). He classifies queries as paedophile or not based only on the fact that
they contain a keyword in a specific list, similar to our explicit list introduced
in Section 2. This is not sufficient, as many paedophile queries contain no such
keyword, the paedophile nature arising from a combination of non-explicit key-
words. Moreover, the author provides neither his dataset nor his keyword list,
thus making it impossible to reproduce his results. He concludes that almost
1% of queries in his dataset are related to child pornography.
Finally, these contributions may be seen as pioneering but limited work on
paedophile query quantification when compared to our own work. Moreover,
although they discuss other interesting issues like age indications in queries and
filenames, presence of sub-communities, and geographic location of users, none
of them address the key question of paedophile user quantification (Section 5).
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7 Conclusion and perspectives
We addressed the problem of rigorously and precisely quantifying paedophile
activity in a large P2P system. We first set up a methodology and designed a
tool for automatic detection of paedophile queries. Thanks to the involvement
of 21 independent highly-qualified experts of the field, we estimated its false
positive and false negative rates. We collected two different datasets containing
hundreds of millions keyword-based queries entered in the eDonkey system, and
established that approximately 0.25% of them are paedophile. We then designed
several complementary methods for quantifying involved users; we established
that at least 0.2% of observed users sent paedophile queries in our 2007 dataset,
similarly to our 2009 dataset.
It is the first time that quantitative information on paedophile activity in a
large P2P system is obtained at this level of precision, reliability, and at such
a scale. This significantly improves awareness on this topic, with important
implications for child protection, policy making and internet regulation.
Moreover, our contributions open several promising directions for future
work:
• Extending our results to other systems. Although our observations are
consistent for two datasets collected at different times and conditions,
which gives them a high level of generality, it is important to obtain similar
quantifications for other datasets and/or P2P systems. Indeed, different
amounts of paedophile activity may occur in different systems, for various
reasons (in particular, secrecy is easier in some systems than others). One
may for instance collect Gnutella queries like in [12, 26] and inspect them
with our tool.
• Improving knowledge and fight against paedophile activity. We open the
way to many studies and actions critical for understanding and fighting
paedocriminality. For instance, the low false positive rate of our pae-
dophile query detection tool (which may be reduced further if more false
negatives are allowed) makes it suitable for filtering at server level and
more generally on any search engine. The large sets of paedophile queries
we provide also open the way for the study of key questions regarding
paedophile activity. One may analyse for instance age indications in these
queries, other topics paedophile users are interested in, and how they start
and develop their interest in paedophile content. A deeper investigation
of the combinations of keywords used in paedophile queries may also sig-
nificantly help to improve our paedophile query detection tool. All these
issues are crucial for fighting paedocriminality and designing appropriate
clinical responses.
• Applying our contributions to other contexts. Finally, many of our contri-
butions are not specific to paedophile activity and/or P2P systems, and
could be used for other purposes. First, our methodology is directly appli-
cable to any specific interest present in P2P systems (and more generally
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search engine logs) which represents a small fraction of the overall activity.
This includes most deviant behaviours, such as zoophilia, rape or incest.
Analysing further our datasets with appropriate methodology may also
shed light on activity regarding various topics in P2P systems, like soft-
ware, movie, music and pornographic contents. Notice that these datasets
also allow trace-based simulations at an unprecedented scale, with great
potential impact for protocol design and testing.
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